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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Adam Deacon Foster asserts on appeal that the district court, when it summarily
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief, abused its discretion by sua sponte taking
judicial notice of the entire case file from the underlying case. Because the district court did not
comply with the specificity requirement of Idaho Rule of Evidence 201(c) when it took judicial
notice of the entire case file, it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. The
district court’s abuse of discretion was not harmless, because the improperly noticed facts
influenced the outcome of this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Bonner County No. CR-2017-457, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging
Mr. Foster had committed two counts of attempted first degree murder, with infliction of great
bodily injury and use of a deadly weapon sentencing enhancements. (No. 46536 R., pp.22-26.)1
The Criminal Complaint alleged that Mr. Foster had shot two sheriff’s deputies. (See No. 46536
R., p.23.) At Mr. Foster’s first appearance, the magistrate court appointed counsel to represent
him. (See No. 46536 R., p.40.)
The magistrate court ordered an Idaho Code §§ 18-210 and 18-211 evaluation for
Mr. Foster, and appointed Philip A. Hanger, Ph.D., to examine and report on Mr. Foster’s mental
condition. (No. 46536 R., pp.57-59.) In February 2017, Dr. Hanger examined Mr. Foster and

1

Mr. Foster is challenging the propriety of the district court’s decision to take judicial notice of
the entire case file from the underlying case, Supreme Court Docket No. 46536. However,
because the district court considered the documents from the underlying case, Mr. Foster has
filed a motion alongside this brief requesting that this Court take judicial notice of the copies of
the documents contained within its own case file for his prior appeal in the underlying case.
1

filed an Evaluation Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-211. (No. 46536 Conf. Exs., pp.12-21.)
Dr. Hanger’s evaluation concluded that, as a direct result of his serious mental illness, Mr. Foster
did not possess an adequate understanding of the proceedings against him, and he did not possess
an adequate ability to assist his counsel in his defense. (No. 46536 Conf. Exs., pp.20-21.) The
evaluation also concluded that Mr. Foster’s heightened distractibility, coupled with his
delusional and disorganized cognitive abilities, significantly impaired his capacity to make
intelligent decisions regarding a plea agreement. (No. 46536 Conf. Exs., p.21.)
Dr. Hanger’s evaluation reported that Mr. Foster stated he was aware the individuals
involved in the charged offenses had been at his home in relation to an outstanding warrant
involving his battery against his mother.

(See No. 46536 Conf. Exs., p.16.)

However,

Mr. Foster also stated that he did not think the individuals were officers, and that he thought they
were thugs wearing jeans. (See No. 46536 Conf. Exs., p.16.) He stated that he became fearful
because his neighbors had persecuted him in the past, he was afraid the individuals were going to
take him into the woods and kill him, and the individuals involved said at one point, “Kill the
Mexican.” (See No. 46536 Conf. Exs, p.16.) Mr. Foster has Hispanic heritage. (No. 46536
Conf. Exs., p.13.) He further stated that, several months before, Senator Bernie Sanders told him
over the phone that they were not cops and he needed to fight for his life. (See No. 46536 Conf.
Exs., p.16.) Mr. Foster thought the individuals were there to harm him and his family. (See No.
46536 Conf. Exs., p.16.)
In March 2017, Dr. Hanger examined Mr. Foster after the magistrate court ordered a
follow-up examination.

(No. 46536 R., pp.80-81; No. 46536 Conf. Exs., pp.22-31.)

Dr. Hanger’s Re-Evaluation Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-211 concluded that Mr. Foster
did not possess an adequate understanding of the proceedings against him or an adequate ability
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to assist his counsel in his defense, and he had a significantly impaired capacity to make
intelligent decisions regarding a plea agreement. (See No. 46536 Conf. Exs., pp.30-31.) The
magistrate court then had Mr. Foster committed, and suspended the criminal proceedings. (See
No. 46536 R., pp.90-91, 98-99.)
In early June 2017, James R. Barry, Ph.D., after evaluating Mr. Foster at the secure
medical facility in May 2017, filed an Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial. (No. 46536
Conf. Docs., pp.65-66.) Dr. Barry’s evaluation concluded that Mr. Foster was currently not
competent to stand trial. (No. 46536 Conf. Docs., p.66.) Later in June 2017, Dr. Barry filed an
addendum to the evaluation, which concluded that it was likely that Mr. Foster could be restored
to competency in the near future. (No. 46536 Conf. Docs., p.68.) Dr. Barry subsequently
evaluated Mr. Foster in July 2017, and filed an update to the evaluation concluding that
Mr. Foster was competent to stand trial. (No. 46536 Conf. Docs., p.70.)
The criminal proceedings against Mr. Foster resumed; in August 2017, after a
preliminary hearing, the magistrate court bound him over to the district court. (See No. 46536
R., pp.140-48, 150.) The State then filed an Information charging Mr. Foster with two counts of
attempted murder, with infliction of great bodily injury and use of a deadly weapon sentencing
enhancements. (No. 46536 R., pp.151-55.) He pleaded not guilty to the charges. (No. 46536
R., p.156.) Based on the parties’ stipulation, the court later entered an order for mediation. (No.
46536 R., pp.166-70.)
Pursuant to a mediated plea agreement, Mr. Foster agreed to plead guilty to amended
charges of two counts of attempted murder, with infliction of great bodily injury sentencing
enhancements. (See No. 46536 R., pp.180-93.) The district court ordered a presentence report
and a psychological evaluation for Mr. Foster. (No. 46536 R., p.195.) Dr. Hanger conducted the
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psychological evaluation in March 2018. (No. 46536 Conf. Docs., pp.156-66.) This evaluation
reported that Mr. Foster’s “behavioral presentation was considered markedly different from that
displayed during this examiner’s previous evaluation of the defendant, approximately 1 year ago,
as evidenced by his clarity in focus to topics, acknowledged awareness of his delusional beliefs,
improved cognitive organization, and lucidity of his expressive communication.” (No. 46536
Conf. Docs., p.165.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Foster’s sister, his mother, and Dr. Hanger testified. (See
No. 46536 6/5/18 Tr., p.53, L.3 – p.103, L.25.) The State recommended that the district court
impose the maximum sentence of fifteen years for each of the attempted murder counts, and an
additional twenty years for the sentencing enhancement, to be served consecutively for a total of
fifty years. (See No. 46536 6/5/18 Tr., p.105, L.24 – p.113, L.9.) Mr. Foster recommended that
the court impose a unified sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed. (See No. 46536 6/5/18
Tr., p.122, Ls.13-15.) The district court told Mr. Foster, “I’m balancing the fact that you
obviously were acting under delusions.” (No. 46536 6/5/18 Tr., p.132, Ls.9-11.) For each count,
the court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve-and-a-half years fixed, to
be served consecutively.

(No. 46536 R., pp.243-46 (Amended Judgment of Conviction).)

Mr. Foster appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentences in
State v. Foster, No. 46536 (Idaho Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2019). (See R., p.64.)
Mr. Foster subsequently filed, pro se, a Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief.
(R., pp.5-11.) As grounds for relief, he asserted, “[counsel’s] failure to bring mitigating evidence
to sentence”; “ineffective assistance of counsel”; and “misdiagnosed mental condition to plead
guilty.” (R., p.6.) On ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Foster asserted that his counsel
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“failed to investigate and get a second opinion on mental health,” and “failed to admit mitigating
evidence at sentencing [i.e.], mental health diagnosis and competency.” (R., p.7.)
In the Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition, Mr. Foster averred, “I
was diagnosed with [psychosis] and had [delusions] and other mental health issues at the
sentencing and did not fully understand my sentence or the consequences of the plea.”
(R., p.10.) He asserted, “I have also been given medication in the BHU that helps me and allows
me to see clearly.” (R., p.10.) Mr. Foster asserted, “Changed circumstances as of treatment
requires a psychiatric examination prior to any plea negotiations.” (R., p.10 (citing federal
appellate circuit cases).) The district court granted Mr. Foster’s motion for the appointment of
post-conviction counsel. (R., pp. 12-15, 29.)
The State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.44-45.) The State contended
that Mr. Foster’s “claims fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient
performance of trial counsel and resulting prejudice.” (R., p.44.)
The State also filed a Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.4650.) The State wrote that Mr. Foster “provided a full trial transcript of this matter in his Petition
and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief. At this time the State does not believe there are any
other pleadings or materials contained within the Court file that are necessary for the Court to
take judicial notice of.” (R., p.46.)
The State argued, “The Petitioner’s mental state was always at the center of this case.”
(R., p.49.) The State described the mental health examinations conducted on Mr. Foster in the
underlying case, and then contended, “A centerpiece of the defense’s presentation in Mr. Foster’s
sentencing hearing surrounded his struggles with mental illness.” (See R., pp.49-50.) The State
argued, “Without question, a cursory examination of the record in this case shows his trial
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counsel recognized the biggest and perhaps only mitigating factor for sentencing in this case was
Petitioner’s mental health issues.” (R., p.50.) The State concluded that “the conduct of trial
counsel for Mr. Foster did not fall below the [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)]
standards. Mr. Foster was provided a good defense.” (R., p.50.)
Mr. Foster, through post-conviction counsel, filed an Issues, Synopsis and Timeline Re:
Post Conviction. (R., pp.53-57.) He asserted that he intended to raise the issues of, “Ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to bring mitigating evidence,” and, “Misdiagnosed mental
condition when he plead guilty.” (R., p.57.)
Mr. Foster also filed a Petitioner’s Argument. (R., pp.58-60.) He asserted “essentially
that prior counsel was ineffective by failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. The
mitigating evidence would have been a second opinion on Defendant’s mental health, which
undoubtedly was a serious issue.” (R., p.58.) “However, no such second opinion was ever
obtained and thus could not have been proffered as evidence.” (R., p.58.)
According to Mr. Foster, “The other issue raised was whether Defendant was mentally
unfit at the time he entered his plea.” (R., p.58.) He asserted that there was no absolute
requirement that second opinions always be sought, whether to get one varied from case to case,
and while it might become better policy to always request one, it was not legally required. (See
R., pp.58-59.) Mr. Foster asserted, “It certainly would have been appropriate to get the second
opinion. Unfortunately, one doesn’t know what that opinion might have been. Would have it
been the same or in conflict? Mitigating or not?” (R., p.59.)
Moreover, Mr. Foster asserted, “The other claim was mental illness at the time of entry of
plea, which would invalidate the guilty plea. One can readily argue the Defendant had been
mentally ill for years before and after the crimes.” (R., p.59.) He asserted, “There was no
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exculpatory evidence, nor any evidence which might mitigate the sentence available, so none
was offered.” (R., p.59.)
The district court conducted a hearing on the motion for summary disposition via Zoom.
(See R., pp.61-62.) The State repeated its argument that Mr. Foster’s “mental condition was
simply the center piece of this entire case.” (See 10/19/20 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-15.) Mr. Foster’s postconviction counsel told the court that Mr. Foster wanted him to offer additional medical records,
but Mr. Foster had not been able to obtain those records. (See 10/19/20 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-14.)
The district court subsequently issued a Memorandum Decision & Order Granting State’s
Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.63-72.) The court noted, “Judicial notice is taken of
the case file in Bonner County Case CR-2017-457, per Idaho Rule of Evidence 201. All
citations to court documents in this Memorandum Decisions are of documents filed in Case CR2017-457.” (R., p.63 & p.64 n.1.) In that note, the district court did not identify the specific
documents or items so noticed. (See R., p.64 n.1.)
After discussing the record in the underlying case and citing particular documents from
that record, the district court determined, “The record of the underlying criminal action, as set
forth above, clearly disproves Mr. Foster’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (See
R., pp.66-70.) The court determined that trial counsel “brought forth mitigating evidence of
Mr. Foster’s mental condition from his mother and sister, as well as from Dr. [Hanger], at
sentencing.” (R., p.70.) Per the district court, “In fact, Dr. [Hanger] testified in some detail
about Mr. Foster’s mental health treatment, diagnosis, and competency during the course of the
criminal proceedings.” (R., p.70.)
The district court also determined, “the record of the underlying criminal action set forth
above is uncontroverted.” (R., p.70.) Based on that record, the court determined that the most
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probable inference to be drawn “is that from the time of her appointment, [trial counsel]
recognized Mr. Foster’s mental condition as a mitigating factor, because she moved the
magistrate court to have him evaluated by Dr. [Hanger], and investigated and sought medical
records related to his mental health and diagnosis.” (R., pp.70-71.) Thus, the district court found
“that the record in the criminal action clearly disproves Mr. Foster’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (R., p.71.)
Further, the district court determined that Mr. Foster’s claim of misdiagnosed mental
condition was unsupported by evidence. (R., p.71.) The court determined, “Mr. Foster’s claim
that he had a misdiagnosed mental condition when he pled guilty is a mere conclusory allegation
unsupported by any admissible evidence.” (R., p.71.) The district court wrote that, to the
contrary, the record showed that client underwent numerous mental health evaluations, and the
criminal matters against him were suspended until he received psychiatric treatment and was
ultimately deemed competent to stand trial. (See R., p.71.) According to the court, “Mr. Foster
has not presented any admissible evidence of any misdiagnosed mental condition at the time of
his entry of plea.” (R., p.71.) Thus, the district court determined, “this claim fails for a total lack
of evidence.” (R., p.71.)
The district court determined that “Mr. Foster’s claims are clearly disproven by the
record of the criminal action or are unsupported by admissible evidence. Therefore, he is not
entitled to the relief requested as a matter of law, and his petition for post-conviction relief shall
be dismissed.” (R., p.71) The court granted the motion for summary disposition, and dismissed
the petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.72.) The district court also issued a judgment
dismissing the petition.

(R., p.73.)

Mr. Foster filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the
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Memorandum Decision & Order Granting State’s Motion for Summary Disposition and the
Judgment. (R., pp.74-76; see R., pp.91-95 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)

9

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of the entire case file from
Mr. Foster’s underlying case, in contravention of the specificity requirement of Idaho Rule of
Evidence 201(c)?

10

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Taking Judicial Notice Of The Entire Case File
From Mr. Foster’s Underlying Case, In Contravention Of The Specificity Requirement Of Idaho
Rule Of Evidence 201(c)

A.

Introduction
Mr. Foster asserts that the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of

the entire case file from the underlying case. In the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
State’s Motion for Summary Disposition, the district court in a sua sponte decision noted,
“Judicial notice is taken of the case file in Bonner County Case CR-2017-457, per Idaho Rule of
Evidence 201. All citations to court documents in this Memorandum Decision are of documents
filed in Case CR-2017-457.” (R., p.64 n.1.) However, Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 provides,
“When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the
same or a separate case, the court must identify the specific documents or items so noticed.”
I.R.E. 201(c). Because the district court did not comply with the specificity requirement of
Rule 201(c) when it took judicial notice of the entire case file from the underlying case, it did not
act consistently with the applicable legal standards. Thus, the district court abused its discretion.
The district court’s abuse of discretion was not harmless, because the improperly noticed facts
influenced the outcome of this case.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
“A post-conviction relief petition initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding.”

State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). “Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant
must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for postconviction relief is based.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869
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(1990)). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil
action, in that the application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the
claim that would suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1). Id. at 44344. Rather, “The application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting
its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.” Id. at 444 (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
“Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court’s own initiative.” Id.
“Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under
I.R.C.P. 56.” Id. “Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant’s evidence has
raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant’s favor, would entitle the
applicant to the relief requested.” Id. “A material fact has ‘some logical connection with the
consequential facts,’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed. 1999), and therefore is determined by
its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.” Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. “If
such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.” Id. “However,
summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not controvert the applicant’s
evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Id.
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing,” an appellate court “must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Id. “Where the
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact,
summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.” Id. (internal
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quotation marks omitted). “When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the
judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, “Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party . . . .”
Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). The appellate court “has free review of questions of
law.” Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 authorizes the judicial notice of adjudicative facts. I.R.E.
201(a). A court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute,
because they are “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction,” or, they “can
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” I.R.E. 201(b). A court “may take judicial notice on its own.” I.R.E. 201(c)(1).
“When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the
same or a separate case, the court must identify the specific documents or items so noticed.”
I.R.E. 201(c).
An appellate court reviews a district court’s judicial notice decision for an abuse of
discretion. See Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 413 (2018) (addressing the review of district court
rulings under former Rule 201(d)). When reviewing a district court decision for an alleged abuse
of discretion, the appellate court considers whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with relevant legal standards; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Took Judicial Notice Of The Entire Case File From The Underlying Case
The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it took

judicial notice of the entire case file from the underlying case, because it did not comply with the
specificity requirement of Rule 201(c). Thus, the district court abused its discretion.

1.

This Issue Is Preserved For Appellate Review

As a preliminary matter, the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion by
sua sponte taking judicial notice of the entire case file from the underlying case is preserved for
appellate review, even though Mr. Foster did not expressly object to the district court’s judicial
notice. Rule 201 provides, “On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of
taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes judicial notice
before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.” I.R.E. 201(e).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently held, “Under the plain language of Rule 201(e),
a party challenging the propriety of a court’s judicial notice and the nature of the facts the court
noticed is required to request to be heard on the matter.” Chaput v. State, No. 47459, 2021 WL
900165, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2021), petition for review denied (Idaho June 7, 2021).
According to the Court of Appeals in Chaput, “Such a request gives the court the opportunity to
decide the party’s challenge. This decision in turn forms the basis for an appellate review.” Id.
The Court of Appeals held, “Absent a request to be heard on a challenge, the party fails to
preserve the issue for appeal.” Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that, because the petitioner in
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Chaput “never challenged the district court’s judicial notice, he failed to preserve the issue for
appeal.” Id.2
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Chaput is contrary to decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court on issue preservation. The general rule is that “both the issue and the party’s position on
the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.” State v.
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019). However, the Court has applied an exception to the general
rule “when the issue was argued to or decided by the trial court.” State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho
550, 553 (1998). The Court “recognizes a distinction between issues not formally raised below
and issues that never ‘surfaced’ below.” State v. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862, 868 (2019) (quoting
Kolar v. Cassia Cnty., Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354 (2005)).
For example, in Jeske, the defendant filed a motion to have his refusal to engage in field
sobriety tests and a breathalyzer test redacted. See id. at 867. In denying the motion, the district
court determined that the refusals to engage in those tests were admissible, and sua sponte
determined that the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood draw was also admissible. See id.
On appeal, the Jeske Court held that, “even though Jeske’s counsel did not explicitly mention the
blood draw at one point in time, the judge specifically identified the blood draw in her ruling.”
Id. at 868. The Court held, “Consequently, the issue regarding Jeske’s refusal to submit to the
blood draw was ruled on, preserved, and will be addressed in this appeal.” Id.
Additionally, in a civil case where the magistrate court issued its order deciding the case,
the magistrate court “sua sponte ruled ‘that the parties shall bear their own attorney’s fees and

2

As seen above, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the petition for review in Chaput on June 7,
2021. However, there is a similar question of judicial notice and issue preservation before the
Court in State v. Neimeyer, No. 46857, 2020 WL 2534003 (Idaho Ct. App. May 19, 2020),
petition for review granted (Idaho Jan. 21, 2021) (No. 48572).
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costs.’” See In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 757-58 (2014). On appeal to the district
court, one party argued the magistrate court erred by summarily denying attorney fees, but the
district court determined that the issue was improperly raised for the first time on appeal because
the party did not seek attorney fees before the magistrate, file any objection to the denial, or file a
motion to reconsider it. Id. at 758. On review, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district
court erred in not vacating the magistrate’s sua sponte ruling. Id. The Court held, “Prior to the
issuance of the court’s order, neither party could have known what the court’s ruling would be
and would have no basis for claiming to be the prevailing party.” Id. The Court also held,
“Once the court ruled, [the party] did not have to file a memorandum of costs or object in order
to preserve the issue for appeal.” Id. Further, the party “did not have to file a motion for
reconsideration in order to preserve the issue on appeal.” Id.
In a later case, the Court explained that the party from Guardianship of Doe essentially
“had not waived consideration of the attorney fees issue because the magistrate court had not
properly acted on the issue and presented them with a meaningful opportunity to object.” In re
Estate of Birch, 164 Idaho 631, 634 (2019). The magistrate court in the Estate of Birch case
awarded attorney fees in its closing order. See id. at 632. The party ordered to pay attorney fees
appealed, and the district court determined that the party “had waived any challenge to the . . .
award of attorney fees by failing to object” to the other’s party’s “memorandum of costs and fees
within fourteen days as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5).” Id. at 633. On
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court held, “this case mirrors a situation already
considered by this Court in [Guardianship of Doe].” Id. at 634. The Court wrote that it had held
in other cases that a trial court could not award attorney fees without providing the non-moving

16

party with an opportunity to raise relevant facts and legal principles in its defense. Id. Thus, the
Court held, “By affirming on this basis, the district court erred.” Id.
Conversely, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Barr, 166 Idaho 783 (2020), held that
the exception did not apply where a district court had not issued a ruling on the issue raised on
appeal. See Barr, 166 Idaho at 787. In Barr, the district court imposed a sentence on the
defendant after reasoning that the mandatory minimum provision of Idaho Code § 19-2520G left
it no discretion to impose a less severe sentence. See id. at 784. The district court had made
comments that it believed it lacked discretion before and during sentencing. See id. at 785-86.
On appeal, the defendant raised the argument that section 19-2520G was unconstitutional. Id.
at 784.
The Court in Barr wrote that the defendant “did not argue that section 19-2520G is
unconstitutional before the district court.” Id. at 787. The Barr Court also recognized, “on
occasion we have allowed an issue that was not formally raised below to be considered on appeal
when the issue was implicitly before the lower tribunal, and was considered and passed on by
that tribunal.” Id. (quoting Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 357 (1990)) (alternation
and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998)). The
defendant in Barr argued that the constitutional issue was properly before the Court, because the
district court made statements about mandatory minimum sentencing laws at the sentencing
hearing. See id. The Barr Court held, “While the district court expressed his personal opinions
and frustrations with mandatory minimum sentencing laws, the issue was not before the district
court; it never heard arguments from the parties or issued a ruling on whether section 19-2520G
was unconstitutional.” Id. The Court held, “Even if these comments constituted a ruling, Barr
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did not raise the issue or take the position that section 19-2520G was unconstitutional.
Therefore, the exception does not apply.” Id.
Here, the district court actually decided the question of judicial notice. The district court
noted, “Judicial notice is taken of the case file in Bonner County Case CR-2017-457, per Idaho
Rule of Evidence 201.” (R., p.64 n.1.) However, the parties had not requested that the district
court take judicial notice in such a wide-sweeping fashion. (See, e.g., R., p.46.) Thus, the
district court made a sua sponte decision to take judicial notice of the entire case file from the
underlying case. Unlike the situation in Barr, the district court did not indicate it had reached its
judicial notice decision before making it, and so Mr. Foster did not have an opportunity to raise
issues related to that decision. See Barr, 166 Idaho at 785-86. Accordingly, the issue of whether
the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice is preserved under the exception
identified by the Court in Jeske and DuValt. See, e.g., Jeske, 164 Idaho at 868; DuValt, 131
Idaho at 553. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Chaput is contrary to those cases and other
precedent where the Court found the exception.
Moreover, the plain language of Rule 201(e) does not actually require a defendant to
request a district court to reconsider a judicial notice decision, to preserve that issue for appeal.
The interpretation of a court rule “must always begin with the plain, ordinary meaning of the
rule’s language,” but “it may be tempered by the rule’s purpose.” State v. Montgomery, 163
Idaho 40, 44 (2017). Rule 201(e) provides, “On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on
the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court takes
judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard.” I.R.E.
201(e). Nowhere in Rule 201(e) does the rule require a party to object to a court’s sua sponte
judicial notice decision, to preserve the issue for appeal.
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In fact, the mandatory language

pertains to the court, which must give a party an opportunity to be heard if the party so requests
after the court takes judicial notice. See id.
Thus, Mr. Foster’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial
notice of the entire case file from the underlying case is preserved for appeal, through the district
court’s decision to so take judicial notice. This Court may therefore review the question of
whether the district court acted consistently with the applicable legal standards when it took
judicial notice.

2.

The District Court Did Not Comply With The Specificity Requirement Of
Rule 201(c)

The district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards when it took
judicial notice of the entire case file from the underlying case, because it did not comply with the
specificity requirement of Rule 201(c).
As discussed above, “When a court takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case, the court must identify the specific
documents or items so noticed.” I.R.E. 201(c). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a district
court erred by taking judicial notice of an entire case file, because it failed to comply with the
specificity requirement of Rule 201. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835-36 (2010).
Here, like the district court in Taylor v. McNichols, the district court here took judicial
notice of the entire case file, without complying with the specificity requirement of Rule 201.
(See R., p.64 n.1.) By taking judicial notice “of the case file in Bonner County Case CR-2017457,” the district court did not “identify the specific documents or items so noticed.” See I.R.E.
201(c). The district court therefore did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863.
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D.

The District Court’s Abuse Of Discretion Was Not Harmless
The district court’s abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice of the entire case file

from the underlying case was not harmless. A court must disregard all errors and defects that do
not affect any party’s substantial rights. I.R.C.P. 61.
The district court’s abuse of discretion here affected Mr. Foster’s substantial rights,
because it influenced the outcome of the case. The district court, after improperly taking judicial
notice of the entire case file in the underlying case, determined that Mr. Foster’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims “are clearly disproven by the record.” (See R., p.70.) The district
court determined, ‘The record of the underlying criminal action, as set forth above, clearly
disproves Mr. Foster’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (R., p.70.)
Per the district court, “First, the record clearly shows that trial counsel . . . brought forth
mitigating evidence of Mr. Foster’s mental condition from his mother and sister, as well as from
Dr. [Hanger], at sentencing.” (R., p.70.) The district court also determined, “Second, the record
of the underlying criminal action set forth above is uncontroverted.” (R., p.70.) Based on the
record, the district court determined, “the most probable inference to be drawn is that from the
time of her appointment, [trial counsel] recognized Mr. Foster’s mental condition as a mitigating
factor, because she moved the magistrate court to have him evaluated by Dr. [Hanger], and
investigated and sought medical records related to his mental health and diagnosis.” (R., pp.7071.)
Additionally, the district court determined, “Mr. Foster’s claim that he had a
misdiagnosed mental condition when he pled guilty is a mere conclusory allegation unsupported
by any admissible evidence.” (R., p.71.) According to the district court, “On the contrary, the
record shows that Mr. Foster underwent numerous mental health evaluations by Dr. [Hanger],
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Dr. Barry, and Kootenai Health during the course of the criminal proceedings.” (R., p.71.)
Further, “the criminal matters against him were suspended until he had received psychiatric
treatment and was ultimately deemed competent to stand trial by a licensed medical
professional.” (R., p.71.)
As seen above, the district court referenced the record from the underlying case when it
determined that Mr. Foster’s issues did not survive summary dismissal. Because the improperly
noticed facts influenced the outcome of the case, the district court’s abuse of discretion was
not harmless.
The district court’s later citations to particular documents in the case file from the
underlying case did not cure the error. (See R., pp.66-71.) The Idaho Supreme Court rejected
such an approach in Taylor v. McNichols. In that case, the plaintiff had an underlying case
where he filed suit against business entities, and while that suit was pending, he filed another suit
against his attorneys in the underlying case. See Taylor v. McNichols. 149 Idaho at 830-31. In
that second case, the district court found that the arguments made by the parties “incorporated
events and actions that occurred in the Underlying Case and, therefore, took judicial notice of the
Underlying Case in toto.” Id. at 831. On appeal, the Court held that the district court erred in
taking judicial notice of the underlying case without complying with Rule 201’s specificity
requirement. Id. at 835-36. The Court reached that conclusion even though it presumably would
have been possible, from the parties’ arguments, to ascertain which “events and actions” from
the underlying case the district court was referencing. See id. at 835-36.
Moreover, holding that the later citations cured the error would render the specificity
requirement of Rule 201(c) a nullity. If the district court could properly take notice of an entire
case file and only later identify specific relevant adjudicative facts, there would be no reason to
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first require the court to specifically identify those facts. Under Rule 201, judicial notice may be
taken only of adjudicative facts, which are controlling or operative facts, rather than background
facts. See Rome, 164 Idaho at 414. Judicial notice is only appropriate when the specific
documents or items to be noticed are identified. See id. at 415. In interpreting the previous
version of Rule 201, the Rome Court explained that specificity is required for parties’ requests
for judicial notice, because, “A request for judicial notice should aid the court in construing and
applying the rules of evidence ‘to the end that the trial may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined[,]’, I.R.E. 102 (1985) (amended 2018).” Rome, 164 Idaho at 416. A party’s request
for judicial notice should “not saddle the court with an inefficient and onerous obligation to
scour the records of underlying or separate cases in an aimless search for information that might
be potentially relevant.” Id.
The same logic applies to judicial notice taken sua sponte by a district court; requiring the
court to specify the documents or items noticed likewise helps ensure judicial efficiency. See id.
Further, this Court generally avoids interpretations of court rules that would render a part of the
rule a nullity.

See State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 422 (2013) (“Generally speaking, ‘it is

incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity.’”)
(quoting Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax. Comm’n, 108 Idaho 147, 151 (1985)); Miller v.
Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 350 (1996) (applying the same standards of construction to a court rule as
are used with statutes).
The district court’s abuse of discretion here affected Mr. Foster’s substantial rights,
because the improperly noticed facts influenced the outcome of the case. Thus, the district
court’s abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice of the entire case file from the underlying
case was not harmless. The judgment dismissing Mr. Foster’s post-conviction petition, and the
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district court’s memorandum decision and order granting the State’s motion for summary
disposition, should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded to the district court for
further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Foster respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, and the district court’s memorandum decision
and order granting the State’s motion for summary disposition, and remand the matter to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 15th day of June, 2021.
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